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Introduction 
 
In this paper, I make connections between education, economic sustainability, popula-
tion dynamics, and segregation outcomes in a society with different ethnic and religious 
groups. My previous research has addressed questions of growth, education, and popu-
lation. Though not a specialist on divided societies, I will show that economy approach 
to modelling these interactions can give useful materials to the scholars working in the 
other social sciences.  
In the other contributions to this book, many aspects of education have been ad-
dressed: textbooks production, choice of education language etc… In this contribution 
we will address the question of education funding, and how it affects the sustainability 
of a diverse society. 
Let me first introduce some definitions I will use in this article. First, one need to de-
fine what a diverse society is. In economics, there is the notion of intra generational he-
terogeneity, which describes a model economy where households differ not only by age 
but also by another dimension. This other dimension can either be “preferences” or “en-
dowments”. Preferences describe how people rank different outcomes, while endow-
ments cover aspects such as abilities. Both can be related to the notions used in other 
social sciences, such as ideology, culture, or ethnicity. The two dimensions can some-
times be interwaved. For example, imagine a society with two types of people, “tradi-
tionals” and “liberals”. The two groups will have different preferences for example with 
respect to the type of public good that should be provided by the government, but could 
also have different abilities to work with other people: traditional having an advantage 
when working with other traditional people, because of the high level of trust between 
them, while liberals being more able to work with any type of person (see e.g. Melindi 
Ghidi, 2009). 
Definition: a diverse society is one in which there are different types of households; 
types reflect ideology, culture or ethnicity. 
The topic of this paper is “sustainability of diverse societies”. I therefore need to 
provide a definition of sustainability. A weak notion of sustainability would require that 
no type disappears in the long-run. In other words, the weight of each group in the so-
ciety should remain positive for the society to remain diverse. They are two straightfor-
ward ways to measure the weight of a group: the demographic weight, and the share in 
income or wealth.  
Definition: Sustainability is achieved when the population shares and the income 
shares of all types does not converge to zero in the long run, i.e. when diversity is pre-
served. 
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Imposing that both the population share and the income share remain positive is a 
way to avoid “repugnant” situations where some type would still have some population 
but would be infinitely poor. 
To analyze whether a diverse society is sustainable, we need to study the dynamics 
of population and wealth. Four aspects are key for the dynamics of diversity: 
1. Income distribution across groups 
2. Differential fertility across groups 
3. The possibility of oblique transmission of culture 
4. The possibility of emigration 
The first two points are the most important ones. The dynamics of income distribution 
will determine how the types’ shares in total income evolve over time, and, in particu-
lar, whether some group keeps impoverishing over time. Differential fertility is ex-
tremely important in the long run in predicting the population shares of the various 
types. In addition to income and population dynamics, the oblique transmission of cul-
ture determines whether it is possible for children of type x parents to become type y. 
Finally, if emigration is possible, it is an factor that determines the size of the groups in 
the long run. 
The above definitions put a general frame to any analyzis of the sustainability of di-
verse societies. Here, we are interested in a very precise and narrow aspect of this ques-
tion. How could education funding systems affect sustainability of diverse societies 
through these different mechanisms? Let me insist that we are going to look at only one 
aspect of education, that is education funding. Education funding will act on the ability 
of each group to accumulate skills, and thereby affects directly the income shares. But 
we are also going to argue that education funding is important for fertility differential 
and emigration. 
Education funding can be of different sorts.  
• Parental funding: when parents pay for the education of their children. 
• Market funding: when students borrow from the market to finance their studies, 
and reimburse later on. 
• Public funding at the federal level: education is paid by the government. Re-
sources are provided by a tax levied on the whole country. 
• Public funding at the regional level: education is paid by local autorities. Re-
sources are provided by a tax levied on part of the country (a region, a state, a 
province etc.). 
In the rest of the paper, I shall use several results from my previous research to highligh 
how education funding can affect the dynamics of types. I shall start by discussing the 
difference between regional public funding and federal public funding. Next I will ela-
borate the model by introducing a choice between public and private education. Then, 
some consequences for immigration decisions will be discussed. Finally, we will stress 
that political power in the long run, which is important to determine how resources are 
shared between the groups, could be itself a function of differential fertility and education. 
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Level of education funding and income convergence 
 
Three different types of education funding are examined by De la Croix and Monfort 
(2000). The first one is a system under which a community based authority finances the 
education of its members by means of taxes collected in the community. In the second 
one, a federal government levies nation-wide taxes to finance education for everybody. 
Finally, in the market funding system, individuals borrow to finance their education. In 
both public sector models, the tax rate is endogenized by implicitly assuming this 
choice to emerge from a voting process. 
One specificity of the approach in to assume that human capital in one group has an 
effect on human capital in the other groups. The extent of this spill-over across groups 
might be affected by the distance between groups. From this point of view, distance 
should be interpreted as any obstacle, whether physical or institutional, that prevent the 
non-market interactions between agents (contacts, exchange of information, face-to-face 
communication). Economic geography indeed considers these interactions as an impor-
tant factor in the process of technology or knowledge diffusion. In our framework, the 
extent by which one group benefits from the others’ human capital is affected by a 
transaction cost which reflects the role of distance in the process of human capital for-
mation. 
Under the regional and market funding systems, there is convergence in income of 
the various groups if and only if there are inter-regional knowledge spill-overs. If those 
spill-overs are weak, only the federal public funding system gives a chance to income 
convergence, thereby increasing the chance of promoting sustainability of the income 
shares of the various groups over time. 
The set-up has also implications in terms of long-run growth rates. The equilibrium 
with federal funding has the same long-run growth rate than the equilibrium with re-
gional funding. The equilibrium with market funding has a higher long-run growth rate. 
The analysis suggests that the choice of a particular education system incorporates a 
possible trade-off between long run growth rate and convergence across groups. The 
equilibrium with federal funding displays a higher convergence speed than the equili-
brium with market funding which itself has a higher convergence speed than the equili-
brium with regional funding. 
 
 
Education funding, segregation and differentila fertility in divided countries 
 
De la Croix and Doepke (2009) analyze the choice of public spending on education 
when voters differ in income. Then they look at how this choice maps into segregation, 
where segregation means a situation where rich and poor do not attend the same type of 
school. 
When the distribution of income and the distribution of types are correlated, which 
seems to be the case in many countries (the extreme example being probably Namibia, 
see Weiland, 2010), we can readily apply their results on segregation by income to se-
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gration by type. Two factors are key to determine whether some groups will resort on 
private schools: income inequality and democracy. 
 
The role of income inequality 
 
Consider first the case of a ideal democracy, in which the rich and the poor have equal 
weight in the political process. Parents send their children to a private school only if 
they would like to endow their children with an education of a much higher quality than 
that provided by the public system. This implies that income inequality is the main de-
terminant of the extent of segregation in the schooling system. In a society with little in-
equality, the preferred education level varies little in the population, so that most or all 
parents use public schooling. In 2000, countries in such a case include Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, The Netherlands, Nor-
way, Russia, and Sweden. For increasing levels of inequality, an increasing share of 
richer people choose private education for their children. The five countries (among 
those in the PISA 2000 survey) with the highest difference in the public subsidization 
rate of the lowest and the highest social class are Austria, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Spain. In this group, the difference between the subsidization rate of schools attended 
by members of the top and bottom social classes averages 25%, which indicates much 
bigger reliance on private schools by the top income type. 
From a policy perspective, perhaps the most important question is how the extent of 
private schooling affects the quality of public schooling. In our political economy mod-
el, when more and more rich parents send their children to private school, these parents 
no longer stand to gain from high-quality public education. These parents therefore vote 
for lower taxes and less spending on public schools. It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that the quality of public schools will decline as the share of private education 
increases. When rich parents opt out of the public system, the remaining funding of the 
public system can be concentrated on fewer students. Thus, even when there is a decline 
in total funding, spending per student (which is one measure of the quality of education) 
may well go up. This is the case for example in the USA, where three different meas-
ures of the quality of public education are positively correlated with inequality across 
States (see Table 1 of De la Croix and Doepke 2009). 
Hence, as long as the poor carry equal weight in the political system, the relationship 
between the share of private schooling and the quality of public schooling is positive. 
 
The importance of endogenous fertility 
 
An additional benefit from private education arises because fertility decisions are endo-
genous. Consistent with empirical evidence, the theory predicts that poorer parents who 
use public schools have more children than those opting for costly private schools. By 
raising their fertility rate relative to what they would choose if they were paying for 
their children’s education, the public school parents impose a fiscal externality on all 
taxpayers. This externality is absent if parents send their children to private schools and 
therefore fully take into account the education cost of the marginal child.  
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This feature is particularly relevant for the dynamics of the groups within society. In 
a divided society, the poor ethnic group relying on public education will have a higher 
fertility rate than the rich relying on private schools. They will accordingly multiply 
faster over time and their share in the population will grow. In the absence of any other 
regulatory mechanism, the relative size of the group of the rich households will become 
negligible, and the diverse society is not sustainable. We will see below that this possi-
bility is even more likely when we move away from the democratic ideal. 
 
The role of the distribution of political power 
 
The findings described so far apply to countries with equal political representation for 
all. But what about countries farther away from the democratic ideal? Consider a non-
democratic country in which only the political views of an entrenched, rich elite matter. 
If inequality is not too severe, one possibility is that most families, including the elite, 
use public schools. In this case, the political elite has a direct interest in the quality of 
public schools, and the outcomes in terms of education spending and the quality of 
schooling are similar to those of an otherwise identical democracy. However, a second 
possibility is that most or all the political elite uses private schools. Public education 
spending and the quality of public schools are then low because the political elite has no 
vested interest in public schooling. Thus, unlike in democracies, a high share of private 
schooling will generally lead to a low quality of public schools.  
Moreover, in dictatorship, there can be multiple equilibria. Similar economies could 
end in different situations, depending on which equilibrium the elite coordinates. When 
everyone with political power uses private schools, a given individual does not want to 
switch to the public system since the quality of the public schooling is low. If, however, 
all (rich) voters were to switch together to the public system, they would vote for a 
much higher quality of public schools, in which case it would be rational to stay in the 
public system.  
Multiplicity arises because, there is a strategic complementarity between the educa-
tion choices of skilled people through the quality of public schools. It means that the 
utility of those taking the action depends positively on how many people take the action 
– we say that actions are strategic complements. In popular terms, there are here vicous 
and virtuous circles. 
 
Introducing the ethnic variable 
 
Introducing the ethnic variable into the model would lead to at least one important con-
clusion. It should still be true that parents sending their children to private schools have 
fewer children – because they face a tradeoff between quality and quantity of children 
through their budget constraint. This is important for the dynamics of population de-
scribed in the introduction. The ethnic group that relies on public school multiplies fast-
er – and its population share in the economy thus increases over time. 
Taking ethnicity into account, it would be relevant to introduce peer effects into the 
production of education. This means that people like to send their children in schools 
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populated by children of the same “type”. This would reinforce the strategic comple-
mentarities introduced above. When everyone of a given type with political power uses 
private schools, a given individual does not want to switch to the public system since 
both the quality of the public schooling is low and the other persons of its type are not 
in public schools. We may therefore expect peer effects to enlarge the scope for mul-
tiple equilibria. Vicous and virtuous circles would be stronger in a divided society. 
 
An ethnic minority 
 
Dottori – Shen (2008) extend the paper by De la Croix and Doepke (2009) by consider-
ing a migrant population which is not entitled to vote. Their conclusions could be ap-
plied in a context where there is a poor population of an ethnic minority which is ex-
cluded from the political system. When the size of this low-skilled minority is large, 
they find that wealthy households from the majority group are likely to opt out from 
public into private schools. Four main effects of the presence of the minority are taken 
into account: (1) greater congestion in public school; (2) lower average tax base for 
education funding; (3) reduced low-skilled wage and so more low-skilled majority 
households dependence on public education; (4) higher skill premium, which induces 
high-skilled majority households to privately invest in their children’s education and 
hence weakens their support to finance public school. Moreover, with endogenous fer-
tility, the opting-out decision taken by some majority parents results in a fertility diffe-
rential between majority and minority households: the minority will grow is size but be-
come relatively poorer and poorer. 
 
 
Emigration and coordination failures 
 
Emigration is another channel through which the relative size of the groups is affected. 
The literature that has studied the main determinants of emigration, and in particular 
emigration of the most skilled, agrees that poverty, instability and fractionalization in 
the home country are important factors.  
Here too there are strategic complementarities between the choices of the different 
members of a group. When skilled households expect their home country to have low 
productivity, to be poorly governed, or to have a low quality education system, the most 
mobile of them will move to a better place. History is full of example of such flights 
(see for example Benrabah (2010) and the Berber decline in Algeria). This can only 
reinforce the bad features of the home country. On the contrary, if people expect high 
productivity and good governance, they will stay, promoting thereby high productivity, 
good schools, right governance, and strong wealth accumulation.  
Such vicious or virtuous circles seem to arise very naturally when one takes into ac-
count the relationship between brain drain and development level in the home country. 
Along these lines, De la Croix and Docquier (2010) built a model which is open to the 
possibility of multiple equilibria. They derive theoretical conditions under which they 
effectively arise. Identifying country-specific parameters in the data, they classify coun-
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tries into different categories depending on whether the observed situation might be one 
of high brain drain and high poverty. Introducing an ethnic or religious factor into the 
model could only reinforce the interdependencies between individual choices. Assum-
ing that people of the same group like to stay together, massive waves of emigration 
could be obversed if individuals in this group expect the other members to move abroad.  
 
 
Differential fertility and the distribution of political power 
 
We have seen so far that the distribution of income and of political power in a society 
affects the educational system, which in turn affects differential fertility between groups 
and the decisions of members of a group to emigrate, and thus population dynamics. 
Population dynamics describe the growth or decline of a particular group, and are thus 
related to the dynamics of diversity in a society.  
Let us now consider on top of these mechanisms that the distribution of political 
power itself, considered exogenous until now, is correlated with the demographic 
weight of ethnic or religious groups. Let us motivate such a dependency and show that 
it can introduce another vicious circle leading to unsustainable outcomes using a pictu-
resque allegory: Easter Island.  
In De la Croix and Dottori (2008) we provide a model of a population race that we 
apply to the Easter Island case, which has now become an synonym for ecological ca-
tastrophe following Diamond’s (2005) book, and a warning for the future. We propose a 
story involving non-cooperative bargaining between clans to share the crop. Each clan’s 
bargaining power depends on its threat level when fighting a war. The biggest group has 
the highest probability of winning. A clan’s fertility is determined ex ante by each 
group. In the quest for greater bargaining power, each clan’s optimal size depends on 
that of the other clan, and a population race follows. This race may exhaust the natural 
resources and lead to the ultimate collapse of the society. 
This model provides a new way of looking at fertility choices. The mechanism 
through which being larger yields an advantage provides a further motive for fertility 
choices, in addition to those generally highlighted (old age support, family altruism, 
etc.). In our model this motive can be traced back to the absence of property rights over 
output, but the principle can easily be extended to any situation where the relative size 
of a group influences its expected payoffs. Consider, for instance, tensions between two 
groups where one feels much weaker in war or weapon technology: enlarging its popu-
lation can be seen as a means to increase its power and partly bridge the gap. Moreover, 
in many bargaining situations the bigger group can take advantage of its size by making 
its voice louder (for example, in subsidy seeking).  
De la Croix and Dottori’s model has possible extensions to modern episodes of con-
flicts involving poor societies. The notion of suboptimal population race, related to the 
possibility of vicious circles, shows the rationale for social problems being increased in-
stead of being solved. In considering what the effect of introducing education is, the key 
variable would be the relative importance of education versus number of people in gain-
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ing political power. A priori, if education is relatively important in getting power com-
pared to population, the framework should lead to an “education race”, which would be 
a better outcome than a “population race”. The possibility of an education race will de-
pend on the availability (funding) of education for all groups. A public funding scheme 
at the federal level seems an appropriate set-up to frame an education race between 
groups, as it would incite everyone to participate.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we considered the effect of education funding on the sustainability of a 
diverse society, where sustainability is defined as a situation in which the population 
shares of different groups does not converge to zero in the long run, i.e. when diversity 
is preserved. We identified several key characteristics. The level of education funding 
(regional vs national vs private) affects income distribution across groups and long-run 
growth. The distribution of income and of political power determine whether some 
groups will resort on private schools. This in turn matters for differential fertility and 
the dynamics of group sizes. When emigration is possible, there is room for multiple 
equilibria and coordination failures. Finally, we stressed that group size is a determinant 
of political power. 
Throughout this paper we have seen the emergence of vicious circles, which are rein-
forced by a presence of an ethnic or religious dimension. As each member of group at-
tached a particular importance to the decisions of the other members of the same group, 
multiple equilibria arise. The rationale for multiplicity is well explained by Shell 
(2008): “The market economy is a social system. In attempting to optimize her own ac-
tions, each agent must attempt to predict the actions of the other agents. A, in forecast-
ing the market strategy of B, must forecast B’s forecasts of the forecasts of others in-
cluding those of A herself. (…) It is not surprising that this process may generate uncer-
tainty in outcomes even in the extreme case in which the fundamentals are non-
stochastic.” 
In order to conclude with a positive note, I can stress one feature of vicious or vir-
tuous circle. To break them, or to use them, one does not necessarily need big changes. 
Small steps could be enough to initiate a change that will be amplified over time by the 
internal propagation mechanisms of the society.  
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